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Casenote
EVIDENCE-Admissibility of an Offer to Plead Guilty Made for
Bargaining Purposes-People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d
412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 921 (1967).
INTRODUCTION
Defendant was charged with the murder of his ex-wife and
one Lorenzo Bernard, who, at the time of the killings, were together
in defendant's wife's bedroom under compromising circumstances.
Estella, the defendant's wife, was shot by the defendant. However,
the cause of her death was a combination of the gunshot wound
and the laceration of her neck when she either fell or was pulled
through the glass pane of the bedroom window. Lorenzo Bernard
died of gunshot wounds inflicted by the defendant. Defendant con-
tended that he killed Bernard in self-defense, and that Estella's
death was accidental.'
While defendant was in custody he sent a note to an inspector
in the district attorney's office requesting a meeting. The inspector
met and talked with the defendant in a room on the mezzanine of
the county jail. Faced with a possible death penalty, the defendant
said something to the effect that he would plead guilty upon cer-
tain conditions to be met by the prosecution's office. In short he
attempted to plea bargain on his own behalf.2 The inspector was
allowed to testify and recount this offer of compromise to the jury.
Before the inspector's evidence was introduced, but while the
inspector was on the stand, the defendant asked for an offer of
proof by the prosecutor out of the jury's presence. The request was
denied. Defendant's motion to strike the evidence, after it had been
admitted, was also denied.
In his first trial the petitioner was sentenced to death on both
counts of murder. The California Supreme Court reversed the
conviction.8
1 Defendant claimed that he had gone to Estella's home at her request
but he was detained and that Bernard arrived in the interim. Because
of Bernard's presence Estella allegedly did not want defendant to
enter. But defendant, in a fit of rage, kicked in the bedroom window
and stepped inside. Bernard attacked him with a knife and defendant
shot Bernard in self-defense. He also claimed that in the scuffle
Estella was accidentally shot and fell into the broken window.
2 Defendant was apprehended on May 21, 1959. It appears that he was
not represented by counsel at the time he made the offer to plead
guilty to the inspector. However, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966), held that neither Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
nor Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) were to be applied retro-
actively.
3 People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal 2d 881, 362 P.2d 473, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1961).
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At his second trial he again was found guilty on both counts
of murder and was sentenced to death on one and life imprison-
ment on the other. The California Supreme Court upheld the con-
Victions and the life sentence, but reversed the death penalty.
Subsequently, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment on
both counts. Two subsequent habeas corpus petitions filed in the
California Supreme Court were denied. Petitioner filed a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States which
was denied with three justices filing a dissenting opinion.5
California uses a bifurcated method of criminal trial in cases
in which the penalty is in the alternative of death or life impri-
sonment. Using this procedure, evidence concerning the guilt or
innocence of the accused is presented and a verdict is rendered
solely on that issue. Then the penalty phase of the trial is com-
menced with the sole issue being that of punishment. 6 The Cali-
fornia court, in the last action, analyzed both the guilt phase of
the trial and the penalty phase. The court concluded that although
in the guilt phase several serious errors occurred, none warranted
reversal, as the evidence overwhelmingly indicated the guilt of
the defendant. However, in the penalty phase of the trial, the
court was of the opinion that "very serious errors also occurred."7
thus mandating a reversal of the death penalty. In view of the
novelty of the two-stage trial and its apparent effectiveness, this
casenote will first discuss the issues arising from the "guilt phase"
of the trial and secondly, the issues arising from the "penalty
4 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
5 People v. Hamilton, 60 CaL 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 921 (1967).
6 CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1967): "The guilt or innocence
of every person charged with an offense for which the penalty is in
the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be deter-
mined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been found
guilty of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, and
has been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity,
there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty,
and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty."
7 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
s The bifurcated trial approach is thought to be effective in that it some-
what relaxes the rules of evidence at the penalty phase of the trial and
self-incrimination problems become less troublesome since the guilt
issue has already been determined. This method works particularly
well in insanity cases. In theory, at the penalty stage the defendant
should no longer be concerned with incriminating himself since by sta-
tutory definition he has already been found guilty, thus theoretically
the court has a free ear to hear any evidence which might work to
mitigate the sentence.
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stage." It will then articulate those issues which Justices Fortas,
Douglas, and Marshall thought militated for the granting of cer-
tiorari. Fourth, this casenote will analyze the effect of this decision
on the law as it exists today.
THE GUILT PHASE
Appellant claimed that it was error to allow the prosecution to
introduce into evidence an offer of a compromise made by him
to a member of the District Attorney's office prior to the trial.9
The California Supreme Court agreed.10
In discussing the reasons for this decision, the court conceded
that in absence of statute the law in California was that an offer
to plead guilty is admissible 1 in evidence as is also the case with
a plea of guilty, later withdrawn; 12 the theory being that by his
plea or offer to plead guilty the defendant has made an admission
of guilt. However, the court cites the California Penal Code sections
1192.1 through 1192.4 (enacted in 1955 and 1957) which sections,
they hold, change the law in California.' s Via these provisions the
9 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 112, 383 P.2d 412, 415-16, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 8 (1963).
10 Id. at 113, 383 P.2d at 416, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
11 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 113, 383 P.2d 412, 416, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 8 citing People v. Boyd, 67 Cal. App. 292, 302-03, 227 P.
783, 786-87 (1924); People v. Cooper, 81 Cal. App. 2d 110, 117-18,
183 P.2d 67, 72 (1947).
12 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 113, 383 P.2d 412, 416, 32 Rptr.
4, 8 citing People v. Ivy, 163 Cal. App. 2d 436, 329 P.2d 505 (1958).
13 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.1 (West Supp. 1967): "Upon a plea of guilty
to an information or indictment accusing the defendant of a crime
divided into degrees when consented to by the prosecuting attorney
in open court and approved by the court, such plea may specify the
degree thereof and in such event the defendant cannot be punished
for a higher degree of the crime than the degree specified."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.2 (West Supp. 1967): "Upon a plea of guilty
before a committing magistrate as provided in Section 859a of this
code, to a crime divided into degrees, when consented to by the
prosecuting attorney in open court and approved by such magistrate,
such plea may specify the degree thereof and in such event, the
defendant cannot be punished for a higher degree of the crime than
the degree specified."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.3 (West Supp. 1967): "Upon a plea of guilty
to an information or indictment for which the jury has, on a plea of
not guilty, the power to recommend, the discretion of imposing, or
the option to impose a certain punishment, the plea may specify the
punishment to the same extent as it may be specified by the jury
on a plea of not guilty. Where such plea is accepted by the prosecut-
ing attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant
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court reasoned that if a plea of guilty to a lesser degree of crime
is not admissible, it would be absurd to argue that an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser degree is.14 In its analysis of this issue the
court fortified its position by reasoning that the obvious purpose of
sections 1192.1 through 1192.4 is to promote the public policy of
encouraging the settlement of criminal cases without the necessity
of a trial.15 The court also analogized offers to plead guilty to a
lesser charge to offers of compromise in civil cases which in Cali-
fornia have been inadmissible for many years. 16 This issue will be
dealt with more extensively when Justice Fortas' dissenting opin-
ion in the denial of certiorari is reviewed.
The second major issue concerning the guilt phase of the trial
revolved around numerous instances of misconduct on the part
of the prosecution. 7 The petitioner assigned as error overemphasis
of the prosecution's theory, 8 an improper attempt to impeach his
own witness,19 and that the prosecutor went far afield to discredit
witnesses in question with no attempt to prove the truth of the
matters asserted in the question.20 The petitioner also assigned as
error that the court exerted undue influence on the jury by the
use of repetitive instructions. 21 The California Supreme Court set
out its displeasure with the actions of the prosecution. After point-
ing out how often it had been called upon to exercise the course of
cannot be sentenced to a punishment more severe than that specified
in the plea."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.4 (West Supp. 1967): 'If the defendant's plea
of guilty pursuant to Section 1192.1, 11.92.2 or 1192.3 of this code be
not accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the court,
the plea shall be deemed withdrawn and the defendant may then
enter such plea or pleas as would otherwise have been available.
The pleas so withdrawn may not be received in evidence in any
criminal, civil or special action or proceeding of any nature, includ-
ing proceedings before agencies, commissions, boards and tribunals."
14 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 114, 383 P.2d 412, 416, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 8 (1963).
15 Id. at 114, 383 P.2d at 416, 32 Cal. Rptr., at 8 citing C. McComvncx,
EVIDENCE (1954) § 251, p. 543.
16 See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1154 (West 1965) and CAL. EviD. CoDE § 1152
(West Supp. 1967).
'7 "It would be an impeachment of the-legal learning and intelligence
of counsel for the People to intimate that he did not know that such
conduct on his part was wholly unjustifiable and calculated to unduly
prejudice the jury against the accused. To indulge a contrary view
is to ignore human experience and the dictates of common sense."
People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 119-20, 383 P.2d 412, 420, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 12 (1963).18 Id. at 118-19, 383 P.2d at 419-20, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
19 Id. at 114, 383 P.2d at 417, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 9.20 Id. at 116, 383 P.2d at 418, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
21 Id. at 118, 383 P.2d at 419, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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action applicable in the Hamilton case,22 the court invoked the
applicable article of the California Constitution,23 and held that "the
errors committed on this phase of the trial, whether considered
singly or in combination, were of minor import when viewed in the
light of the overwhelming evidence that appellant committed these
premeditated murders. '24 It was obvious that the court was quite
displeased with errors committed and the way the prosecution
handled the trial. The court strongly inferred that in the future,
such abuses by the prosecution would be handled more severely.
THE PENALTY PHASE
If the court went out of its way not to reverse the guilt phase
of the trial, this was not the case in the penalty phase. Here the
court not only found the errors serious, but also prejudicial. 2 5
The first error concerns the actions of the trial court in dis-
charging one of the regular jurors and substituting an alternate
during the trial of the penalty issue.
Since the trial court felt that the trial would be a protracted
one, two alternate jurors were selected and seated near the regular
jurors. The trial of the issue of guilt proceeded with the regular
twelve jurors and a verdict of first degree murder resulted. The
alternates did not participate. During the "guilt" deliberation the
jury twice returned for further instructions on which occasion
several jurors asked questions indicating that they were giving
serious consideration to a verdict of second degree murder.
A subsequently replaced juror was among this group. In the
course of the trial this juror mentioned that during her lunch recess
she had been casually reading the California Penal Code.26 In the
following recess the prosecution moved to dismiss this juror on
the ground that: (1) she had read and misunderstood the Penal
Code; (2) she had formed certain views which she would retain
and urge on the other jurors; and (3) she had disclosed her opposi-
tion to a verdict which would result in the death penalty.27 The
22 Id. at 120, 383 P.2d at 420, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
23 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 .
24 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 121, 383 P.2d 412, 421, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 13 (1963).
25 Id. at 122, 383 P.2d at 421, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
26 An interrogation of the juror by the judge in his chambers disclosed
the fact that the juror had read the California Penal Code in its
entirety during the noon recess throughout the trial because she felt
that a person should be as well informed as possible.
27 Id. at 123, 383 P.2d at 422, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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court replaced the juror with one of the alternate jurors.2 s The
applicable code section sets forth four distinct grounds for discharg-
ing a juror and submitting an alternate.29 The defense contended
that the matters which resulted in the dismissal did not constitute
"good cause" (as contemplated by the statute) in that: reading
the Penal Code would not indicate that the juror is unable to
perform her duty. Mere confusion caused by a prior reading of
the code does not indicate that the juror has formulated an opin-
ion as to what the law is or should be and it does not indicate
that she had urged any preconceived views on other members
of the jury. Furthermore, the defense contended that the court's dis-
cretion is not sufficiently broad to legitimately authorize the court
to make any such determination from the facts; and finally that
the legislative history of the section indicates a consistent refusal
by the legislature to authorize unrestricted substitution.0
The court agreed with the petitioner's contentions3 ' and distin-
guished a line of cases3 2 which held such a dismissal of a juror to
be error but not prejudicial. The court reasoned that in the instant
case the error was prejudicial in that the juror's dismissal was
28 The court relied on CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1089 (West Supp. 1967): "If at
any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case
to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause
shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if
a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefore, the
court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an
alternate, who shall then take his place in the jury box... as though
he had been selected as one of the original jurors," for the necessary
authority. (emphasis added).
29 The four are (1) death, (2) illness, (3) a finding on good cause
shown that the juror is unable to perform his duty, or (4) upon thejuror's request. In the instant case obviously only one of the above
grounds is applicable, namely number (3). CAL. Pmq. CoDE § 1089
(West Supp. 1967).
30 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 125, 383 P.2d 412, 423-24; 32 Cal.
Rptr. 4, 15 (1963).
31 ' There is merit in appellant's position. Certainly, the mere reading
of the Penal Code, for the sole purpose of becoming better informed,
cannot, without more, be either misconduct or an act which results
in inability to perform the duties of a juror. If the juror had given
any indication that she would substitute her knowledge (gained from
reading the code) for the instructions of the court, or would convey
such knowledge to the other jurors, then it might have been said
that she was incapable of performing her duties. But there was no
such indication." Id. at 125, 383 P.2d at 424, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
32 See People v. Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 295 P. 333 (1930); People v.
Abbott, 47 Cal. 2d 362, 303 P.2d 730 (1956); People v. Taylor, 139
Cal. App. 2d 490, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961); People v. Green, 47 Cal.
2d 209, 302 P.2d 307 (1956); and In re Devlin, 139 Cal. App. 2d 810, 294
P.2d 466 (1956).
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favorable to the prosecution. 3 The court felt that this error alone
might well warrant reversal, however, when they coupled this
error with the cumulative effect of the other errors they felt that
the sum total was clearly prejudicial.
Another important issue was whether or not the legislature
in its provision for the type of evidence that may be presented
during the penalty phase of a trial, intended to relax the ordinary
rules of competency.34 The court looked to People v. Purvisas
which held that evidence of an earlier crime must meet the rules
of admissibility governing proof of that crime or must be otherwise
properly admissible in the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial.3 6
The court concluded that the admission of evidence of extra-
judicial admissions, allegedly made by petitioner, confessing the
commission of, or participation in, prior crimes as to which no
other evidence was produced was also error. The court summed
up its quandary by stating:
Thus, on the penalty phase of the trial, serious and substantial
errors were committed. The trial court erroneously removed a
qualified juror who ... had indicated some doubts as to whether
the death penalty should be imposed. In addition, a considerable
amount of inadmissible evidence was admitted, and the prosecutor
was guilty of serious misconduct that must be held to have been
intentional and premeditated. The errors as to the admissibility
of evidence and misconduct all directly related to the character of
the defendant. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that
defendant was a man of bad character and had a long line of
previous convictions. That evidence would have justified the jury
in imposing the death penalty.
Under these circumstances were these errors prejudicial within
the meaning of Article VI, section 4 , of the California Constitu-
33 '"While it has been said repeatedly, in the cases cited above, that a
defendant is not entitled to be tried by a jury composed of any
particular individuals, but only by a jury composed of qualified and
impartial jurors, this does not mean that either side is entitled to
have removed from the panel any qualified and acting juror who, by
some act or remark made during the trial has given the impression
that he favors one side or the other. It is obvious that it would be
error to discharge a juror for such a reason, and that, if the record
shows (as it does here), that, based on the evidence, that juror was
inclined toward one side, the error in removing such a juror would
be prejudicial to that side." People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 128,
383 P.2d 412, 425, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4, 17 (1963).
34 CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (West 1956).
35 52 Cal. 2d 871, 881, 346 P.2d 22, 27 (1959).
36 People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 130, 383 P.2d 412, 426, 32 Cal. Rptr.
4, 19 (1963).
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tion? How should that article be applied to the penalty phase of
the trial?37
The court first concludes, in answering the above questions,
that the proper test to use in the "guilt phase" is the "miscarriage
of justice test" included within the California Constitution.38 On
the other hand the court had a harder time deciding what test to
use in deciding the effect of errors on the penalty phase. They
apply the strict test of "any substantial error occurring during
the penalty phase of the trial that results in the death penalty,
since it reasonably may have swayed a juror, must be deemed
prejudicial."39 The court reasons that:
But in determining the issue of penalty, the jury, in deciding
between life imprisonment or death, may be swayed one way or
the other by any piece of evidence. If any substantial piece or part
of that evidence was inadmissable, or if any misconduct or other
error occurred, particularly where, as here, the inadmissable evi-
dence, the misconduct and other errors directly related to the
character of appellant, the appellate court by no reasoning process
can ascertain whether there is a 'reasonable probability' that a
different result would have been reached in the absence of error.
If only one of the twelve jurors was swayed by the inadmissible
evidence or error, then, in the absence of that evidence or error
the death penalty would not have been imposed. 40
Thus, on the penalty phase of the trial the court held that the
errors and misconduct were substantial and prejudicial and conse-
quently they reversed the lower court.
THE DENIAL OF CERTIORARI
On October 23, 1967 the Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari in Hamilton v. California.4 1 However, Justice
Fortas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice. Marshall and
Justice Douglas concurred. These Justices felt that there were
some important issues to be decided.
37 Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 426, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 22. "Article VI, section
4Y, of the Constitution (California) provides that a reversal shall not
follow because of error 'unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that
the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'"
Id. at 135, 383 P.2d at 430, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
z8 "That a miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the court,
'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is
of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error." Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 430, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
39 Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 430, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
40 Id. at 136, 383 P.2d at 430, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
-41 Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 921 (1967).
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The first issue which Fortas felt mandated resolution by the
court was the admissibility of a plea made for the purpose of bar-
gaining or compromise. He draws an analogy between the general
rule in a civil suit where such evidence would not be admissible,42
no matter how little money is at stake.
Second, the opinion suggests that grave constitutional problems
may be involved whenever such evidence is admissible. Accord-
ingly, where the complaint is murder and the possible penalty
is death, does not the admission of evidence of an offer to bargain
seriously jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial? The opinion
also indicates that although the California Supreme Court agreed
that it was error; they held that it was "harmless error," and
hence the guilt conviction was not reversed.43 The dissenters felt
that the admission of this evidence was of critical importance to
the trial and that it could not be considered harmless under the
standards announced by the California Supreme Court in Chapman
v. State of California."
Finally, the three justices would decide the issue of whether or
not a separate hearing is required on the question of voluntariness
when a prosecutor uses an offer to plead guilty as he would use
42 4 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1061-1062 (3d ed. 1940). See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 68; and 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § § 68.01-68.06 (1966).
In Nebraska, an offer to compromise or settle a disputed claim is
privileged and inadmissible in an action upon that claim. However,
for some unknown reason, this rule is qualified in that any offer of
compromise, in order to fall within the exclusionary rule, must be
one in which the offeror denies or only hypothetically assumes liability
for the purpose of the offer in order to induce and effect a settlement.
Express admission of existing liability, or the conceding of the exist-
ence of a fact, is admissible even though it is embraced in an offer
of compromise. The deciding fact, according to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, is "whether or not the party making the admission intended
to concede a fact hypothetically in order to induce and effect a settle-
ment, or to declare the existence of a fact." Brown v. Hyslop, 153 Neb.
669, 677, 45 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1951). Certainly, public policy dictates
that settlement of controversy be encouraged. However, the existing
law in Nebraska undermines this policy by inducing counsel, when in
compromise negotiations, to talk only in "hypotheticals." For obvious
policy reasons, Counsel should be free, if not encouraged, to carry on
discussions concerning compromise without fear that such discussions
could reflect adversely on their client's case. See also, NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-901 (Reissue 1964); Callen v. Rose, 47 Neb. 638, 66 N.W.
639 (1896); Eldridge v. Hargreaves, 30 Neb. 638, 46 N.W. 923 (1890);
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 52 Neb. 745, 73 N.W. 291 (1897);
Kierstead v. Brown, 23 Neb. 595, 37 N.W. 471 (1888); Wright v. Moore,
53 Neb. 3, 73 N.W. 211 (1897).
43 Hamilton v. California, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 921 n. 4 (1967).
44 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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a confession. They would also decide whether the procedures out-
lined in Jackson v. Denno45 and Sims v. State of Georgia4 6 are
required.
There is some existing case law on whether or not admissions
made either for bargaining purposes or against one's own interest
are "confessions. 47 In State v. Snell,48 a Nebraska case, defendant
made a voluntary statement at a preliminary examination before
a magistrate. The court held the statement admissible as an "ad-
mission" or a "confession" at the subsequent trial.
The cases involving admissibility of prior guilty pleas, offers to
plea bargain, etc., are hopelessly in conflict.49 But the trend, as evi-
45 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
46 385 U.S. 538 (1967), Sims provides that the trial judge must first
determine if any confession was freely and voluntarily given before
it is admitted to the jury. Also, when the confession is submitted to
the jury after the trial judge has determined that it was freely and
voluntarily given, the jury may give it absolutely no weight in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of a defendant
47 See generally Monroe v. United States, 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963);
Moreland v. United States, 270 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1959); Pugh v.
State, 42 Ala. App. 499, 169 So. 2d 27, (1964); Roach v. State, 39 Ala.
App. 271, 97 So. 2d 837 (1957); Williams v. State, 214 Md. 143, 132
A.2d 605 (1957); State v. Snell, 177 Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
48 177 Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964). In this case, a patrolman was
allowed to testify, over objection, that defendant had pleaded guilty
to driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and leaving
the scene of a personal injury accident. Specifically, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that: "Under the previous decisions of this
court, the testimony in question would be admissible. A voluntary
statement made by the defendant at a preliminary examination before
a magistrate is admissible as an admission or confession at a subse-
quent trial. Adams v. State, 138 Neb. 613, 294 N.W. 396. Evidence
that the defendant admitted that he was driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquqor at the time the accident occurred would be
admissible as a circumstance tending to show a reason for not stopping
at the scene of the accident" Id. at 400, 128 N.W.2d at 826-27. The
Court reversed Snell's conviction however, holding that White v.
State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) required that a defendant be
represented by counsel when brought before a magistrate for a pre-
liminary hearing. Snell was not represented by counsel at the hearing.
49 See generally Monroe v. United States, 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963);
Roach v. State, 39 Ala. App. 271, 97 So. 2d 837 (1957); State v. Downs,
185 Kan. 168, 341 P.2d 957 (1959); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass.
555, 141 N.E.2d 269 (1957); Williams v. State, 214 Md. 143, 132 A.2d
605 (1957); State v. Jackson, 221 Or. 315, 351 P.2d 439 (1960); Goodlet
v. Goodman, 34 N.J. 358, 169 A.2d 140 (1961); People v. Spitaleri, 212
N.Y.S.2d 53, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 173 N.E.2d 35 (1961); People v. Bevilacqua,
170 N.Y.S.2d 423, 12 Misc. 2d 558 (1957); Christesson v. State, 172
Tex. Crim. 27, 353 S.W.2d 218 (1962).
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denced by Justice Fortas' dissent, 50 may be towards not admitting
them into evidence.
However, as mentioned before, Nebraska recently reaffirmed the
admissibility of such evidence.51 Perhaps the problems as sug-
gested by Justice Fortas and his companion dissenters foreshadow
constitutional problems forthcoming in this area. Nebraska and
other states which have interpreted these pre-trial admissions as
confessions, might, in the near future, have to apply the Jackson v.
Denno52 and Sims v. Georgia53 safeguards.
CONCLUSION
California changed its common law when by statute it made
attempts to plea bargain inadmissible. 54 It would be only naive,
given the present status of our criminal justice system, to main-
tain that the practice of "plea bargaining" can, should, or will be
eliminated in the near future.55 Although the practice gives rise to
serious problems, 56 there are important arguments for preserving
it. Pragmatically, our already overtaxed criminal justice system
simply cannot provide the number of judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel necessary to operate a system in which most de-
fendants go to trial. Present programs to expand appointment of
counsel for indigents promise to strain available resources for some
50 Hamilton v. California, 389 U.S. 921 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
51 State v. Snell, 177 Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823 (1964).
52 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
53 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
54 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1192.1 and 1192.4 (West Supp. 1967).
55 "The question of guilt or innocence is not contested in the overwhelm-
ing majority of criminal cases. A recent estimate is that guilty pleas
account for 90% of all convictions; and perhaps as high as 95% of
misdemeanor convictions. But the Commission has found it difficult
to calculate with any degree of certainty the percentage of cases dis-
posed of by guilty plea, since reliable statistical information is limited.
Clearly it is very high." The President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts
9 (1967).
56 A fundamental problem is the propriety of offering the defendant an
inducement to surrender his right to a trial. There is always the pos-
sibility that the deal offered might be attractive enough to induce an
innocent defendant to plead guilty because he felt the risk of going
to trial was too high. Overburdened prosecutors may compromise
cases which call for severe sanctions. The practice itself seems to
arouse to a greater sense unease and suspicion. Along with all of the
above there is no judicial review of the propriety of the bargain, and
no check of the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant to plead
guilty. Finally, there is no guarantee that the judge will comply with
the bargain. See, Task Force Reports: The Courts at 9, 10.
CASENOTE
time to come. At best, our adversary system is an imperfect method
of factfinding. Plea negotiation is an inherent facet of prosecutorial
discretion, which discretion is vitally needed when one considers
the myriad possible fact situations that could possibly fall under
a particular statute or statutes.
This writer is of the view that the increasing use of the sixth
amendment should somewhat ease this problem. Certainly, evidence
of defense counsel's plea negotiation would not be admissible.
Thus, when evidence is admitted of an offer to compromise made
by an unrepresented indigent, along with discouraging defendant
cooperation, aren't we adding insult to injury for had he been ade-
quately represented, as is now constitutionally required, the issue
wouldn't have arisen?,
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57 The Advisory Committee On The Criminal Trial of The American
Bar Association Project On Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice
has concluded that: "(a) A defendant should not be called upon to
plead until he has had an opportunity to retain counsel or, if he is
eligible for appointment of counsel, until counsel has been appointed
or waived. A defendant with counsel should not be required to enter
a plea if his counsel makes a reasonable request for additional time
to represent the defendant's interests. (b) A defendant without
counsel should not be called upon to plead to a serious offense until
a reasonable time, set by rule or statute, following the date he was
held to answer. When a defendant without counsel tenders a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to a serious offense, the court should not
accept the plea unless it is reaffirmed by the defendant after a reason-
able time for deliberation, set by rule or statute, following the date
the defendant received the advice from the court required in section
1.4." A.B.A. Advisory Committee On The Criminal Trial, Standards
Relating To Pleas Of Guilty Sec. 1.3 at 6, 7 (1967). The A.B.A. Project
also concludes that: "Unless the defendant subsequently enters a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere which is not withdrawn, the fact that the
defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney engaged in
plea discussions or made a plea agreement should not be received in
evidence against or in favor of the defendant in any criminal or civil
action or administrative proceedings." Id., Sec. 3.4 at 12.
